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NOTE 
We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: 
The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches 
Rebecca Strauss* 
In October of 1995, Aaron Salvo was studying and living at 
Ashland College.1 College officials informed local FBI agents that 
they suspected Salvo of possible child molestation and related conduct 
based on incriminating electronic mail.2 FBI agents approached Salvo 
at his dormitory, asked to speak with him in private about the suspi­
cious mail, and suggested they speak in Salvo's dorm room.3 Salvo 
agreed to speak with the officers, but declined to do so in his room be­
cause his roommate was there, and he did not want to get anyone else 
involved in the embarrassing nature of the upcoming conversation. 
Salvo claimed that during the conversation in another room, an FBI 
agent requested permission to search Salvo's room by telling Salvo 
"we can do it discreetly or go to the Courthouse and talk to the 
Ashland County Prosecutor, get a warrant and be back with uni­
formed police to conduct the search, and he [Salvo] would be excluded 
from the room."4 Another agent told Salvo that the first agent "was 
not playing games, and would search his room whether Salvo let him 
or not."5 
At a hearing to suppress the evidence discovered during the search 
of his room, Salvo argued that his consent was coerced because he did 
not feel like he could choose to refuse his consent.6 The district court 
found that Salvo's consent was involuntary because of the FBI agent's 
statement that "they could do it the easy way or the hard way."7 The 
Sixth Circuit overturned the district court's ruling by holding that "[i]t 
is well-settled that the agent's statements to the effect that he would 
obtain a warrant if Salvo did not consent to the search does not taint 
* The author would l ike to thank Professor Yale Kamisar for inspiring the topic of this 
Note, and Adam Strauss for his unending support and encouragement. 
1. United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1998). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 946. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 954. 
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Salvo's consent to a search."8 The court reasoned that since the FBI 
agents would have been able to obtain a warrant if they had sought 
one, the threat was not "baseless" and therefore not coercive.9 
A few years before Salvo's experience, the South Carolina police 
stopped Furman Lattimore's car for speeding.10 The police officer 
asked to search Lattimore's car for narcotics or contraband.11 
Lattimore asked the officer to confirm that if he didn't consent, the of­
ficer would search his car anyway. The officer confirmed his suspicion: 
"If you don't, I feel you're hiding something. Therefore, I'll call a drug 
dog right up the road to come down here and let him search the car. "12 
Lattimore signed the consent form, but later moved to suppress the 
evidence seized pursuant to the search. The district court ruled that his 
consent was voluntary, even though it was "concerned" with the 
statement about the drug dog.13 The Fourth Circuit upheld the search 
despite the government's concession that the police officer did not 
have the legal authority to permit a drug dog to sniff Lattimore's car.14 
Both cases illustrate the problem that this Note addresses: when law 
enforcement informs the subject of a search that they will search the 
premises with or without the subject's consent, is the resulting consent 
valid? 
The authorities may conduct a consent search only if the person 
subject to the search grants valid consent. Over thirty years ago, in 
Bumper v. North Carolina,15 Justice Stewart expressed the simple 
statement: "[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent."16 
Bumper was an appeal from a rape conviction in North Carolina. The 
petitioner wished to suppress a .22-caliber rifle found in his home 
during a search that he argued violated the Fourth Amendment.17 The 
police seized the rifle in the petitioner's home, which he shared with 
8. Id.; see also United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding under simi­
lar circumstances that the police officer's promise to return with a search warrant did not 
vitiate otherwise voluntary consent). 
9. Salvo, 133 F.3d at 954. 
10. United States  v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996). 
1 1. Id. at 649. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 650. 
14. Id. at 652 
15. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
16. Id. at 550. 
1 7. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un­
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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his sixty-six-year-old grandmother, an African American widow. Their 
home was located on a rural, isolated dirt road.18 Four white officers 
met the grandmother at her front door, and one announced "I have a 
search warrant to search your house." The petitioner's grandmother 
told them to "go ahead" and opened the door for them.19 
At a motion to suppress the evidence,20 the police relied on the 
grandmother's consent, rather than a search warrant, to justify the 
search. The issue presented to the Court was whether consent is valid 
when the police inform the consenter that an officer possesses a search 
warrant. Justice Stewart concluded that "there can be no consent un­
der such circumstances."21 The Court held that consent cannot later 
justify a search conducted on the basis of an invalid search warrant. 
The same is true, the Court reasoned, when no search warrant was is­
sued at all or when the State does not rely on a warrant to justify the 
search.22 Bumper's narrowest holding is that when consent to a search 
is given only after police falsely inform the consenter that they have a 
search warrant in their possession, the consent is invalid as a result of 
"colorably lawful coercion."23 
If police officers tell a subject of a search that they are in the proc­
ess of getting a search warrant, or will be applying for a search warrant 
to search her home and then ask for consent, it seems that the case 
would be similar to Bumper, in that "when a law enforcement officer 
claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in 
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search."24 Surpris­
ingly, courts have not held that Bumper invalidates consent when an 
officer informs the consenter that he will obtain a search warrant.25 
Thus, courts have applied Bumper's prohibition against "colorably 
18. The Court probably included the grandmother's race, age, and rural location since 
those facts seem to add to the overall suspicion that her consent was not entirely voluntary. 
19. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546. 
20. A motion to suppress evidence demands that certain otherwise probative evidence 
not be used by the prosecution against the defendant because the police obtained i t  unlaw­
fully. 
21. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548. 
22. Id. at 549-50. In the present case, the Court expressed doubt that any warrant was 
ever issued, or if one was, whether it was valid. Id. at 550 n.15. 
23. "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, 
he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is 
instinct with coercion - albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there 
cannot be consent." Id. at 550. 
24. Id. For the argument that Bumper invalidates consent in such situations, see Thomas 
G. Gardiner, Consent to Search in Response to Police Threats to Seek or to Obtain a Warrant: 
Some Alternatives, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 163, 165-66 (1980). 
25. See, e.g., Idaho v. Kilby, 947 P.2d 420 (Idaho 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that Bumper invalidated his consent when a police officer told defendant that he would ap­
ply for a search warrant if defendant refused consent). 
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lawful coercion"26 only in the narrow instance when an officer claims 
to have a warrant in his possession.27 This Note argues that when an 
officer conveys the impression to the subject of a search that he will 
return with a warrant if the subject of the search does not offer his 
consent, the situation is deceptive, and coercive, and courts should not 
permit it.28 
The most common search employed by the police is the consent 
search: some ninety-eight percent of searches police conduct without a 
warrant they conduct pursuant to consent.29 The consent exception is 
valid only if the consent is voluntary and given by one with the 
authority to give such consent.30 While considerable debate surrounds 
both the issue of who has the ability to consent,31 and the voluntary na-
26. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. 
27. Courts even fail to strike down searches in which the police claim to have a warrant 
with them, distinguishing those cases from Bumper in unimportant ways. See, e.g., United 
States v. Swink, No. l:OOCR135-1, 2000 WL 1 264145 ( M.D.N.C. July 19, 2000) (dismissing 
defendant's reliance on Bumper to invalidate his consent because officers told him of a 
search warrant after he consented) ; United States v. Acosta, 786 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 965 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Jaw enforcement 
officer's actions were lawful in light of Bumper when he knocked on defendant's door, yell­
ing "It's the police; open the door. . .  I have a warrant; open the door"); Byars v. Arkansas, 
533 S.W.2d 1 75 (Ark. 1976) (holding that Bumper did not prevent defendant's consent from 
being voluntary where his consent was given after police told him they had a search warrant, 
which later turned out to be invalid). 
28. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in order to 
protect private citizens from government intrusions into their private spheres. To effectuate 
this prohibition, the Supreme Court has developed a presumption in favor of requiring that 
police obtain a search warrant before conducting a search. This requirement ensures that a 
neutral magistrate will weed out unreasonable searches. The alternative is to leave that 
judgment to the police, and as the Court stated in Katz v. United States, "Bypassing a neutral 
predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amend­
ment violation only in the discretion of the police. " 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
Nonetheless, the Court has created so many exceptions to the warrant requirement that 
the vast majority of those searched do not enjoy the protection a search warrant offers them. 
Such exceptions to the search warrant requirement include exigent circumstances, 
Minnesota v. Olson 495 U.S. 91 (1990), searches of vehicles, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
386 (1985), inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the plain 
view doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), searches incident to lawful 
arrests, Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and consent searches. 
29. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: 
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES (National Center for State Courts 1984) 
at 21. 
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez 497 U.S. 1 77, 190 (1990) ( Marshall, J., dissenting) ; 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 1 0, 13 (1948). 
31. See generally Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the 
Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987); Nancy J. Kloster, Note, An Analysis of 
the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party Consent 
Searches: The Defendant's Perspective, 72 N.D. L. REV. 99 (1996); Matt McCaughey, Note, 
And a Child Shall Lead Them: The Validity of Children's Consent to Warrantless Searches of 
the Family Home, 34 u. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. LAW 747 (1995);  Ira c. Rothberger, Jr., Case­
note, IJlinois v. Rodriguez: Should Apparent Authority Validate Third-Party Consent 
Searches?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 481 (1992). 
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ture of consent, this Note primarily focuses on the issue of what consti­
tutes voluntary consent. 
The Supreme Court prescribed the test to determine voluntariness 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, decided in 1973.32 The Court held that 
lower courts should look to the totality of the circumstances sur­
rounding the consent in determining voluntariness.33 Under 
Schneckloth a consenter does not have to be informed of his right to 
refuse to consent. Voluntary consent means that the consenter had a 
choice to refuse and the police obtained the consent without practicing 
any coercive tactics.34 Courts may consider the consenter's knowledge 
of his rights as one factor in the total equation. 
While the Schneckloth Court helped determine what is not neces­
sary for voluntary consent, it did not explore fully when coercion ex­
ists. Some of the courts routinely consider the number of uniformed 
officers present,35 factor the display of weapons,36 time of day,37 the 
existence of prior illegal police action, the defendant's maturity, 
sophistication, mental or emotional state,38 the defendant's previous or 
subsequent refusal of consent, whether the defendant is in custody,39 
the defendant's belief that the officers would not find any incriminat­
ing evidence,40 physical mistreatment of the defendant by police,41 and 
32. 412 U.S. 218. 
33. Interestingly, the Court had rejected the same test as applied to confessions in 
Miranda v .  Arizona, 384 U.S 436, reh'g denied, 385 U.S 890 (1966). The Court in Miranda 
held that the inherent coerciveness of in-custody interrogation required special safeguards 
against compelling a suspect to incriminate himself. The Court held that in order to fully 
"exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effec­
tively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 467. The Schneckloth Court looked to the confession context to analyze when 
consent (in the confession context, consent to incriminate oneself) is truly voluntary. The 
Court, ignoring Miranda, found that their past self-incrimination cases all looked to the total 
circumstances of the confession, and not to the "presence or absence of a single controlling 
criterion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226. Later in the opinion, Justice 
Stewart squarely confronted Miranda, stating that its holding is "simply inapplicable" to 
consent searches. Miranda's holding rested on the inherent coerciveness of custodial sur­
roundings. In the consent search cases, there are no such inherently coercive techniques. 
"Miranda, of course, did not reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, 
which is most directly analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not 
indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive." Id. at 247. 
34. The specifics are discussed in detail in Part II. 
35. See People v. Reed, 224 N.W.2d 867 ( Mich. 1975). 
36. See United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d 1 299 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mapp, 476 
F.2d 67 (2d. Cir. 1973); Lowery v. State, 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
37. See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973). 
38. See United States v. Bynum, 125 F. Supp.2d 772, 783 (E.D.Va. 2000). 
39. See United States v. Citizen, 234 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hall, 
565 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1978); Guzman v. State, 672 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1984). 
40. See United States v. Citizen, 234 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 2000). 
41. See United States v. Mccurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent.42 Some cir­
cuits apply the same specific factors to each case,43 and others view 
each case individually.44 The federal circuits, in particular, have strug­
gled with the situation where a police officer told the consenter that 
42. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1 1 03, 1112  (9th Cir. 2000). 
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 11 03, 1112  (9th Cir. 2000): 
This Court considers the following five factors in determining whether a person has freely 
consented to a search: (1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting offi­
cers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the defen­
dant was told he had the right not to consent; and (5) whether the defendant was told that a 
search warrant could be obtained 
See also, e.g., United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1996): 
[The list of factors courts use to determine whether consent was voluntary are:] (1) whether 
the encounter occurred in a public place; (2) whether the suspect consented to speak with 
the officers; ( 3) whether the officers informed the individual that he was not under arrest 
and was free to leave; (4) whether the individuals were moved to another area; (5) whether 
there was a threatening presence of several officers and a display of weapons or physical 
force; (6) whether the officers deprived the defendant of documents she needed to continue 
on her way; and (7) whether the officers' tone of voice was such that their requests would 
likely be obeyed. 
The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, examines the semantics of the officer's statement to 
determine its coerciveness. United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 362 n.7. If the officer in­
forms the consenter that he will attempt to procure a warrant if the subject refuses to con­
sent, there is no coercion. Alternatively, if the officer tells the consenter that he will defi­
nitely obtain a warrant, the court may consider that statement coercive. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit employs a unique approach: the tone of the officer's voice determines 
whether the "search warrant statement" is coercive, or alternatively, informative. If the offi­
cer promises to return with a warrant in a non-threatening manner, he is merely informing 
the consenter of his right to force the officer to seek a warrant. See also United States v. 
White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although no warning of her right to refuse con­
sent was given, the promise that the police would obtain a search warrant if she refused im­
plicitly communicated the option to her.") On the other hand, if the officer makes the state­
ment in a threatening way, the statement may vitiate the resulting consent if there is no 
actual probable cause to support the warrant. See Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1112. 
Other federal circuits ignore the semantics and tone of voice. See, e.g., United States v. 
Evans, 27 F.3d 1 219, 1 231 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 528-29 (2d 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980), and instead look to whether 
the officer makes the search warrant statement in good faith or bad faith. A bad faith state­
ment is made when there is no basis for a search warrant, or used as a pretext to obtain con­
sent, United States v. Slavo, 133 F.3d 943, 954-55 (6th Cir. 1998) . Courts sometimes look to 
whether actual probable cause existed for a search warrant to determine if there was an ac­
tual basis for the search warrant statement. Other times, they look to the subjective knowl­
edge of the officer: if he believed actual probable cause existed, there was a basis for the 
statement, and there is no coercion. See United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d. 678, 688 
(S.D. Tex. 2000) ("The courts have not clearly stated whether it is critical that the searching 
officer had a reasonable, good-faith belief that a warrant would properly issue, or that the 
warrant could in fact have been issued consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 966 F.2d 559, 562 (1 0th Cir. 1992) (testing the vol­
untary nature of consent by the totality of the circumstances test, but not listing specific fac­
tors to consider); United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[I]n deter­
mining whether (the defendant's] consent was voluntary, we must scrutinize the facts, and 
strike a balance between (the defendant's] right to be free from coercive conduct and the 
legitimate need of the government to conduct lawful searches."). 
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the officer would return with a search warrant if he refused to con­
sent.45 
This Note argues that it is deceptive and coercive for an officer to 
make a search warrant statement while requesting consent, and there­
fore the resulting search violates the Fourth Amendment. It further 
argues that courts should have the broader goal of limiting consent 
searches, or at least not encouraging them, and therefore should pro­
hibit the deceitful police tactic of making such statements. Part I as­
serts that courts should disfavor consent searches because they too 
closely resemble the general warrants that the Fourth Amendment 
seeks to prohibit. Moreover, the scope of a consent search is consid­
erably broader than a warrant search, and therefore significantly im­
pacts the privacy interests of the consenter. Part II argues that courts 
should consider deceitful police practices when determi1,1ing the volun­
tariness of consent because deception represents the police overstep­
ping their authority. Part III explains that the promise of a search war­
rant is deceptive and therefore should invalidate consent because the 
promise misinforms the consenter of his rights. This Note concludes 
that courts should not permit a search warrant statement unless it is 
part of a comprehensive statement of the consenter's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Montanez, 202 F.3d 434, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2000) (re­
fusing to overturn the district court's ruling that consent to a search is valid even if the offi­
cer stated he will "obtain other means" to seize the evidence because that statement is not 
the same as saying he is presently entitled to search); United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 
1 1 03, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that sometimes the 9th Circuit has held that 
promising to return with a warrant does not preclude a finding of voluntary consent, and at 
other times such a promise is deemed coercive, and resolving the conflict by holding that the 
coerciveness of the promises depends on whether the promise was made "in a threatening 
manner"); United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 954 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the FBI 
agent's statement to the suspect that if he refused consent, the officer would return with a 
warrant, did not coerce the suspect because the statement was not baseless or a pretext to 
coerce the defendant); United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the officer's promise to return with a search warrant was not coercive because there was 
actual probable cause, even though the officer told the consenter "it would go an awful lot 
easier" if he just consented, and the officer promised to search more of the consenter's prop­
erty if he forced the officer to return with a warrant); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 
542 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that baseless threats to obtain a search warrant may be coercive, 
but "genuine" statements do not render invalid otherwise valid consent); United States v. 
Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1992) (admitting that, while the officer's promise to return 
with a warrant may have induced consent, it was not coercive since the police had probable 
cause for a warrant); United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 362 n. 7 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that if the officer states he will attempt to obtain a warrant, there is no coercion, but indi­
cating that if the officer stated he would obtain a warrant, resulting consent may violate 
Bumper); United States v. Culp, 472 F.2d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that an officer did 
not coerce the defendant into consenting when he stated that a fellow officer was "in the 
process" of getting a search warrant, and that the home would be searched whether the de­
fendant liked it or not. The court did allude to the Bumper case, but found that other evi­
dence surrounding the search evidenced consent). 
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This Part argues that consent searches resemble general warrants 
in that they are left to the discretion of the police office, and have al­
most limitless scope. The drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to 
prohibit general warrants, which permitted indiscriminate searches.46 
Consent searches, like general warrants, allow the police almost limit­
less discretion of who to search, and a wide scope of where to search.47 
Consequently, just as the Fourth Amendment put an end to general 
warrants, it should constrain the use of consent searches. Section I.A 
argues the similarity between general warrants and consent searches. 
Section LB explains the differences between consent searches and 
warrant searches. 
A. General Warrants 
The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy by limiting the 
discretion of law enforcement to search private places.48 At the time 
the founders drafted the Constitution and Bill of Rights, they were 
familiar with "general warrants'', which offered no such protection 
from the abusively used discretion of the state. The general intent of 
the Fourth Amendment was to limit the discretion and abuse of dis­
cretion by law enforcement to invade the privacy of citizens. When the 
founders drafted the Bill of Rights, they were most concerned about 
"general warrants."49 The term applied to warrants that lacked par-
46. See Florida v. Bostick, 5 01 U.S. 429 (1991} ( Marshall, J., dissenting). 
47. See Section B of this Part. 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The relationship between the first '.'reasonable" clause and second "warrant" clause is a 
matter of frequent debate. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997) ; Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: 
The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N. M. L. REV. 33 (1979-80). In addition to the 
prohibition of general searches, the Fourth Amendment either imposes a warrant require­
ment or a standard of reasonableness. One reading of the Fourth Amendment imposes a 
presumption of the need for a warrant, unless a specific exception applies. Val id consent is a 
well established exception to the warrant requirement. The other interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment asserts that there is no requirement of a warrant for every search, but 
just a requirement that every search be reasonable. Reasonableness does not always mean a 
police officer must obtain a warrant beforehand. If, after a warrantless search, the court 
finds the officer acted reasonably, then the search should be upheld. 
D espite which view of the Fourth Amendment scholars and the Court eventually agree 
on, all agree that the founders strongly disfavored general warrants for reasons that hold 
true today. The founders disliked general warrants because the warrants left too much dis­
cretion to pol ice officers. Similarly, consent searches leave considerably more discretion to 
the police than warrant searches. Therefore, if courts are to be true to the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, they should constrict the use of consent searches. 
49. Davies, supra note 48, at 558. 
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ticular information, lacked a complaint under oath, or lacked a show­
ing of cause for the search.so The colonists condemned general war­
rants because they allowed law enforcement too much discretionary 
authority to search or arrest as they liked, without adequate supervi­
sion.s1 In addition to fearing searches lacking any probable cause, the 
founders were concerned about placing the determination of the exis­
tence of probable cause, or when to search without it, in the hands of 
the police.s2 These concerns are equally forceful in modern times be­
cause of the almost limitless discretion consent searches grant to the 
police.s3 
The Supreme Court recognizes that the original intent of the draft­
ers of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent general searches, but 
fails to associate general searches with consent searches. Justice 
Marshall noted that although the general warrant was an effective 
means of law enforcement, "it was one of the primary aims of the 
Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from the tyranny of being sin­
gled out for search and seizure without particularized suspicion not­
withstanding the effectiveness of this method. "s4 In other instances, 
the Court has explained that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is 
to prevent general searches, although they have not couched it in gen­
eral warrant terms. In Johnson v. United States, for instance, the Court 
stated that when the right of privacy must yield to a search, a judicial 
officer should be the one to authorize that invasion.ss If the police, in­
stead of a detached magistrate, could decide when probable cause ex­
ists, the Fourth Amendment would be a "nullity."s6 
Consent searches come dangerously close to general warrants by 
giving the searching police officer undue discretion to determine the 
scope of the search. The Court has held that when the subject of a 
search voluntarily gives his consent, it is reasonable for a police officer 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 578. Hostility towards granting discretionary power to law enforcement offi­
cers was also why writs of assistance were disapproved. Id. at  580. 
52. The primary reason for fearing police discretion was classism: the upper class did not 
want to be harassed by the "lower class" law enforcement officers. They preferred to have 
one of their own, a magistrate, make the determination as to which homes deserved to be 
searched because of adequate suspicion. For a thorough discussion of the original purpose of 
the search warrant requirement, including this classist argument, see Davies, supra note 48, 
at 577-78. 
53. See supra Part I.B. 
54. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
55. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Stegald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981) ("In the absence of exigent circumstances, we have consis tently held 
that such judicially untested determinations are not reliable enough to justify an entry into a 
person's home to arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a home for objects in the ab­
sence of a search warrant."). 
56. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. 
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to conduct a search without a warrant.57 Like general warrants, how­
ever, consent searches give the police officer wide discretion as to 
whom to search, and the scope of that search.58 Consent searches rob a 
neutral magistrate of the authority to determine probable cause and 
scope.59 The liberal use of consent searches also allows for suspicion­
less searches, clearly violating the Fourth Amendment's requirement 
of probable cause.60 Thus, at the very least, the original purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's prohibition of general 
warrants should force courts to hesitate before determining the valid­
ity of a consent search. 
B. Consent Searches v. Warrant Searches 
As explained above, the Fourth Amendment requires search war­
rants to prevent general searches. The requirement of a search war­
rant has a real impact on the subject of the search - it serves to pro­
tect him. A consent search offers no such protection. If probable cause 
exists to search a home, the police investigating the theft have a 
choice: they can go to the house and ask permission to search it, or 
they can ask a magistrate for a search warrant to search the home.61 
First, assume the officers decide on a consent search. They might do 
so, even if probable cause to support a search warrant exists.62 The po­
lice officers can gain consent to search the home after explaining to 
the owner that they are searching for evidence of a crime, even if it is a 
different crime than the one they are actually investigating.63 
57. At least one author claims that because of the wide scope, consent searches are 
never reasonable. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 
WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 186 (1991 ). 
58. Rotenberg, supra note 57, at 186. 
59. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
60. "Because of the frequent reliance upon consent searches, it is apparent that the con­
stitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures widens or narrows, de­
pending upon the difficulty or ease with which the prosecution can establish such consent. " 
WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 8.1 (2d ed. 1987). 
61. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1940) (stating that a consent search 
is an established exception to the requirement of both a search warrant and probable cause). 
62. Consent is often requested even if the officer has other authority for the search. The 
California Attorney General advises Cal ifornia police officers to "always ask for consent to 
search even when you have other authority for the search. It can never hurt, and it may help 
a great deal. . . .  " Rotenberg, supra note 57 at 190 (quoting the California Attorney Gen­
eral). Officers may follow such advice because they believe the application process for a 
search warrant is overly technical, limits the scope of searches too much, is time consmning 
to acquire, and is less likely to produce suppressible evidence than a consent search. 
LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.1. 
63. See Michael J. Friedman, Comment, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The Problem of 
Limited Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 313, 314-
15 (1998) (explaining that such deceit on the part of the police is legal). 
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Once the owner agrees to the search, the police have received con­
sent to search any area in his home where they reasonably may find 
evidence of the crime they claimed to be investigating.64 The scope of 
their consent search is limited to the stated purpose of the search.65 If, 
in the course of the search, the police come across evidence of another 
crime the police can seize the goods.66 They may seize evidence of a 
crime they intended to search for in the first place, even though this 
purpose was hidden from the subject of the search.67 The plain view 
doctrine does restrict the police to seizing items in plain view only if 
the officer is legally entitled to be in a place to view the incriminating 
evidence.68 Since the police may lawfully search just about everywhere 
in the home, depending on the creativity of their stated purpose for 
the search, just about everything will be in plain view.69 
The scope of a consent search is limited to that which a reasonable 
person listening to the subject of the search's consent would have 
thought he consented to.70 If the police exceed the scope of that con­
sent during the search, however, and the subject fails to object, the 
64. The scope of a consent search depends on whether the consent is specific or general. 
If general consent is given, which means the consenter did not specify a limitation, the police 
can conduct a general search. The general search is limited to what a reasonable officer 
would think the consenter had agreed. LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.l(c). If the officer e x­
pressed the intent of the search, the search is limited by that expressed intent. Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). The police must respect any limit the consenter specifies, so 
when the consenter agrees but says "you can look in the bedroom" or gives some other lim­
iting instruction the police must respect it. LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.l(c). 
65. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248. 
66. As long as the police did not explicitly tell Citizen that any evidence seized would 
only be used to solve the abduction case, they can use the evidence for any criminal investi­
gation, even if the other purpose was the real purpose of the search. See Friedman, supra 
note 63, at 338-40. 
67. The issue would differ if officers promised to use any evidence seized only for the 
child abduction case. But so long as the police do not state explicitly that they will use evi­
dence only for a specific purpose, they can use it for anything. See United States v. Andrews, 
746 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1984). 
68. The plain view doctrine allows the police to seize items without a warrant if the offi­
cer views the item from a lawful vantage point, he has a right of physical access to it from the 
lawful vantage point, and its nature as an article subject to seizure is immediately apparent. 
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 
U.S. 874 (1971). "Lawful vantage point" means that the officer is not violating any laws, in­
cluding the Fourth Amendment, by being in that location. An officer can be in a location 
lawfully if he is not in a private place that gives rise to Fourth Amendment protection, or he 
is in a private location, but there under a valid search warrant or e xception to the search 
warrant requirement. See Horton, 496 U.S. 128. 
69. A recent change in the plain view doctrine permits the police to seize evidence in 
plain view, even if  they were trying to find just such evidence. See Horton, 496 U.S. 128. Pre­
viously, the plain view doctrine was limited to inadvertent discoveries. For an analysis of this 
change's impact on consent searches, see Friedman, supra note 63. 
70. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248. 
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search is valid, and any evidence is admissible.71 Thus, assuming that 
the subject of the search does not object to a police search broader 
than his consent,72 the police may search without limit.73 In addition to 
a wider scope of search, the subject is also less protected because 
courts are less likely to exclude evidence obtained from a search based 
on consent than evidence obtained from a warrant search because the 
police don't have as many technical requirements with which to com­
ply. 74 The exclusion of impermissibly obtained evidence should deter 
police transgression. Since courts are less likely to exclude evidence 
from a consent search, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule 
does not work to prevent police from overstepping the already gener­
ous boundaries of the scope of a consent search.75 
The warrant search is more limited and protects individuals in two 
ways. It requires probable cause before the police can search a home, 
and it limits the scope of the actual search. If the police chose to 
search a home with a search warrant instead of the owner's consent, 
the police would have gone to a magistrate and demonstrated the req­
uisite level of probable cause76 to obtain a search warran,t successfully. 
The police also would have signed an affidavit explaining the basis of 
their suspicion, and any later legal challenge to the sufficiency of 
probable cause on which the warrant rested would be based on the 
71. LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.l(c). 
72. It is extremely unlikely that a consenter would know the legal scope of a search, and 
also know that if he does not object at that moment, he waives the right to object. Further­
more, psychological studies show that people are extremely likely to submit to a request 
from an authority figure, both when giving consent and when allowing a search beyond its 
original scope. See generally Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamante: 
Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (1997). 
73. See Rotenberg, supra note 57, at 185-86. 
74. The exclusionary rule is quite simple: it prohibits the use of any evidence that was 
searched for or seized illegally. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S 871 
(1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S 383 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule, but l imiting it to the federal courts). For 
an explanation of why courts are Jess l ikely to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a consent 
search than evidence seized pursuant to a warrant search, see David S. Kaplan & Lisa 
Dixon, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation 
and the Law: I. Coercive and Exploitative Bargaining: Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 
74 DENY. U. L. REV. 941, 948 (1997) ("Evidence produced during a consent search is less 
l ikely to be suppressed on technical grounds ."). See also Joseph G. Casaccio, Note, Illegally 
Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842 (1987) 
(describing how some courts consider consent an intervening factor in tainted fruit analysis) . 
75. The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has become the main rationale for the 
rule itself. The Court has reinforced its belief in the deterrent effect many times. See Arizona 
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
76. Probable cause describes the quantum of evidence needed to show specific items are 
probably located at a certain place at this time. 
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"four corners" of the affidavit.77 If, after considering the affidavit, the 
magistrate determined that the issuance of a warrant was proper, the 
warrant would detail the specific goods the police had cause to believe 
were in the home,78 and where police could look for the goods.79 Thus, 
the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, in contrast to the 
consent search described above, would be conducted in the following 
manner. The police would commence a search in the places specified 
in the warrant for the specified goods. The warrant would authorize a 
search only in places where the police could find the evidence of the 
actual crime under investigation. If the police exceeded the scope of 
the warrant, they would not be able to use any evidence obtained out­
side the permitted scope. Moreover, a court would likely suppress any 
"fruit" of the illegal search.80 The potential exclusion of any evidence 
seized outside of the warrant's scope motivates the police to stay 
within the specified scope. 
Although a warrant search better protects his privacy, courts and 
others may have little sympathy for a subject of a search and his right 
to privacy when there is probable cause that he committed a criminal 
act, and therefore he forfeits his right to privacy in a way law-abiding 
citizens do not.81 Courts seem to uphold consent searches, however, 
even though there is no reason to suspect a person of any wrongdoing. 
Consider the following variations. Suppose that that probable cause 
did not exist to suspect the subject of the search of a crime, so if the 
police had applied for a warrant, the magistrate would have turned it 
down. The police mistakenly think they have probable cause, but pre­
fer to conduct a consent search to save time, expand the scope of the 
search, or protect seized evidence from later attack in court. A re-
77. The "four comers" requirement prevents the police from adding subsequently gath­
ered information at trial or a hearing. The police must cross the probable cause threshold at 
the time they apply for the warrant, no matter how much information they gather at a later 
time to support their original suspicions. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) 
("Under the cases of this Court, an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by 
testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought the warrant but 
not disclosed to the issuing magistrate.") .  
78. LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 4.6. 
79. Id. at § 4.5. 
80. "Fruit" refers to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, first used in Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The catchy name of the doctrine first ap­
peared in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). In general, the doctrine requires the 
exclusion of evidence if its discovery was the direct result of a violation of the Constitution. 
Of course, this general proposition is subject to numerous caveats. See New York v. Harris, 
495 U.S. 14 (1990); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 
463 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975) ;  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
81. Compare Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (holding that the entry of an 
informant under the guise of legitimate purpose violates the Fourth Amendment) with Lewis 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (holding that when an informant is invited to e nter to 
do i llegal business, the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
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viewing court would likely uphold the consent search even though 
there is no actual probable cause to believe the subject has broken any 
law.82 
Suppose the police knew they did not have probable cause to 
search the subject's home. Maybe they did not have any legitimate 
reason to suspect the subject of a specific crime, but thought that if 
they could search every nook and cranny, they might find some evi­
dence of some sort of wrongdoing and, at the very least, he would be 
put through the inconvenience and humiliation of a police search. A 
neutral magistrate would not issue a search warrant in this latter case, 
yet a reviewing court would uphold the consent search.83 The dichot­
omy arises from the fact that consent searches are not only exceptions 
to the search warrant requirement, they are also excepted from any of 
the requirements for a search warrant to be issued, like probable 
cause. Thus, the police do not need to have individualized suspicion 
for a consent search.84 
The current judicial framework encourages consent searches, de­
spite the impact on privacy and the contradiction with the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Court encourages consent searches in at 
least two ways: allowing consent searches after coercive police tactics 
that are not allowed in other contexts,85 and by singing the praises of 
consent searches. Leading the way is Scheckloth v. Bustamante. 86 In 
Scheckloth, the last Court decision to address consent searches com­
prehensively, the Court highlighted the virtues of consent searches. 
According to the Court, the subjects of consent searches are less in­
convenienced, law enforcement gathers valuable incriminating evi­
dence that may be unavailable in the absence of a consent search, and 
a fruitless consent search may exculpate the innocent.87 The Supreme 
Court's encouragement of consent searches has lead directly to lower 
courts approving consent searches. For example, an Illinois court was 
faced with a questionable consent search. After quoting Schneckloth, 
the court reasoned that the consent search was actually better for the 
82. If the police promised to return with a search warrant in this case, courts would con­
sider it a "good faith threat. " See discussion infra Part III. 
83. If the police promised to return with a search warrant in this case, it would likely be 
struck down as a "bad faith threat" if the police knew they did not have probable cause. See 
discussion infra Part III. 
84. Moreover, police attempt to receive consent for a search most often when there is 
no probable cause, and no search warrant could be obtained. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 603 
A.2d 71 (N.J. 1992); Mcintosh v. State, 753 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1988). 
85. See infra Part II for a discussion of how the Court prohibits coercion in the confes­
sion context, but has remained silent on the same type of coercion in the consent search con­
text. 
86. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
87. 412 U.S. at 227-43. 
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defendant, and upheld the search.88 When the Court encouraged con­
sent searches in Schneckloth, it did not consider the ways consent 
searches intrude on a person's rights under the Fourth Amendment.89 
The truth is that consent searches allow causeless, boundaryless 
searches whereas warrant searches better protect privacy. Therefore, 
courts should apply strict standards when validating consent. 
II. DECEPTION BY POLICE OFFICERS 
The existence of coercion negates the effect of consent.90 Unfortu­
nately, courts have difficulty determining when coercion exists 
because the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance. The 
"totality of the circumstances" test leads to considerable ambiguity, 
especially when distinguishing involuntary consent and coerced 
consent. Courts should eliminate this confusion, at least in regards to 
the situation of the police deceiving consenters of their Fourth 
Amendment rights. This Part discusses what coercion is, pointing out 
its ambiguous nature. Then, this Part argues that courts should con­
sider deceit as coercion, just as they do in the confession context. Since 
coercion negates consent, police deception should negate any resulting 
consent. 
The totality of the circumstances test for detecting coercion leads 
to and indeed requires courts to judge each case on an ad hoc basis. 
Since there is little guidance from the Supreme Court,91 the circuits are 
confused. For example, in the Fifth Circuit, the court held consent was 
involuntary when the police told the defendant they would test his 
blood for alcohol content, when in fact they tested it for a rape 
match.92 The same circuit, however, held that consent was voluntary 
when the police asked the defendant to show a firearm to show a con­
nection with robberies, when their real purpose was to charge the de­
fendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm.93 The court dis­
tinguished the cases because in Andrews the police did not explicitly 
88. People v. Ford, 403 N.E.2d 512, 518-19 (Ill. 1980); see also State v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 
210, 213 (N.C. 1997) (stating that Schneckloth specifically addressed the situation of a police 
officer choosing to conduct a consent search instead of a warrant search, and because of the 
benefits of a consent search police should have the discretion to choose a consent search, 
resulting in the consent in the present case being validated); United States v. McCray, 692 F. 
Supp. 1019, 1021-22 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (quoting Schneckloth's language that suggests consent 
searches are less inconvenient for the subject of the search, and then holding that police do 
not need any suspicion to request consent). 
89. 412 U.S. 218. 
90. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
91. See generally y ALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.9 (9th 
ed. 1999). 
92. Graves v .  Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970). 
93. United States v. Andrews, 746 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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promise the defendant that the evidence would only be used for one 
purpose.94 The Fifth Circuit's experience demonstrates how the total­
ity of the circumstances test leads to unpredictable results. 
Judging the validity of consent is difficult because courts often con­
fuse voluntary consent and coerced consent. Sometimes courts use the 
terms interchangeably, but intending different meanings. Coercion is 
coercive conduct by law enforcement, whereas voluntariness refers to 
the subjective state of mind of the subject of police pressure, and 
whether they feel they have a choice in how they respond to the police 
request. 
In the confession context the Court has focused on the coercive 
behavior of police officers and disregard involuntariness. The case of 
Colorado v. Connelly95 is a useful example of the distinction between 
coercion and involuntariness. The mentally disturbed defendant, with­
out any prompting by authority, sought out the police and confessed 
to a murder because voices in his head demanded it. He confessed in­
voluntarily in that he did not believe he had any choice, although the 
police did not coerce him into confessing. The Court held the confes­
sion valid because of the lack of coercive behavior by the police. 
Unlike confession cases, in the context of consent searches, courts 
look to both coercion and involuntariness without distinguishing be­
tween the two. For instance, in the Eleventh Circuit, the list of factors 
routinely considered in their totality of the circumstances test include 
both coercive factors, like the presence of coercive police procedure, 
and voluntary factors, like the defendant's knowledge of his right to 
refuse consent and the defendant's education and intelligence.96 
As the Colorado Court held implicitly, the coercive actions by law 
enforcement determine the admissibility of a confession. Voluntari­
ness is too slippery a concept for the courts to use effectively as a test 
since, at some level, a suspect always has a choice. Just as courts are 
not able to inquire into the voluntariness of a confessor, courts are not 
able to validate how viable the consenter thought his other choices 
were at the time in question. Courts should validate consent if it is free 
of coercion; the voluntariness of the consent should not be given im­
portance. Like confession law, courts should judge consent to search 
by a coercive approach. In both contexts, courts should focus on the 
actions of police officers rather than the subjective knowledge and in­
tention of the consenter. While courts do not distinguish linguistically 
between coercion and voluntariness, the difference is important. 
Focusing on the coerciveness of police behavior provides an objective 
method to determine the nature of the consent instead of attempting 
94. Id. at 250. 
95. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
96. See Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 517 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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the daunting task of imagining what the consenter was or was not 
thinking at the time he consented. 
Deception should constitute coercion in the context of consent 
searches. The Supreme Court has not addressed deception in the con­
text of inducing consent to be searched, and lower courts and com­
mentators have only addressed it rarely.97 Though the court has not 
addressed the issue in the context of consent searches, it has done so 
in the context of confessions and interrogations.98 Miranda v. Arizona, 
the case that has shaped interrogation law and practice since 1966, 
prohibits law enforcement from using threats or trickery to entice a 
suspect into waiving his rights.99 While Miranda prohibits the use of 
deceit to obtain a waiver, it does not directly address police deceit in 
obtaining a confession once the suspect waived his rights. At least one 
commentator has suggested that Miranda should prohibit post-waiver 
deception, but law enforcement or the courts have not adopted that 
view.100 Theoretically, police trickery may negate the voluntary nature 
of the resulting statement under the "totality of the circumstances" 
test, but it rarely does in practice.101 Interrogation law permits deceit 
once the suspect is made aware of his rights and voluntarily waives 
them, but the law strictly prohibits deceit as a method of convincing 
the suspect to consent to speak to the police. 
Just as courts do not allow deceit in the interrogation context, they 
should not allow it in the search context either.102 The Supreme Court, 
in Schneckloth, deemed the comparison between coerced confessions 
97. "[T]here is no common understanding as to what constitutes permissible deception 
in enforcing the criminal law." LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 8.2(n). 
Police do not understand deception to be inappropriate at all. One criminal procedure 
scholar, Christopher Slobogin, has grouped police deception into three categories: under­
cover work, search and seizures, and interrogation. Chistopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext and 
Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 778-88 (1997). The search and 
se izure category includes "lying about police authority to conduct the search or seizure." Id. 
at 781. "For instance, police may state that they do not need a warrant when they know the 
law requires they have one, assert they have a warrant when they do not, or state they can 
get a warrant when in fact they know they can not." Id. 
98. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
99. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 ("Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, 
tricked, or caj oled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily 
waive his privilege . "). 
100. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
581 (1979). 
101. Statements made by the defendant to the police must be voluntary. To determine 
whether such statements are voluntary, courts use the "totality of the circumstances" test. 
See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986). 
102. For one court's hint that such should be the rule, see U.S. v. Acosta-Chavez, No. 
97-3288, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17159, at *20 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) ("Con- · 
sent induced by trickery or deception may be involuntary."). The current situation is that 
often the court may rule depending on the court's attitude toward the specific coercion in 
question, just how deceitful it actually is. See LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.2(n). 
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and coerced consent appropriate and extremely useful.103 In fact, the 
majority of the voluntariness analysis in Schneckloth consisted of ex­
ploring voluntariness in interrogation jurisprudence. Detractors may 
argue that the Schneckloth Court's ultimate holding was that consent 
to searches should be governed by a different standard than consent to 
be questioned. True, the Court compared consent searches to the 
waiver of interrogation law rights, and concluded that the inherent co­
ercive nature of custodial interrogations required a more rigorous 
bright line rule, the now famous Miranda warnings, than consent to a 
search required.104 The Court, however, reached its conclusion by con­
sidering only non-custodial consent, whereas Miranda specifically ad­
dressed custodial situations.105 The Schneckloth Court, in every other 
aspect, considered consent to a search comparable to the waiver of 
Miranda rights. The only difference they noted, which is the point the 
case turned on, was the amount of inherent coercion present.106 
An alternate solution to determining when the law should prohibit 
deceit is to explore the philosophical justifications for lying, and to ap­
ply those justifications to police deception to determine if any can be 
justified.107 According to this approach, police deception is defensible 
only if used against an identified threat to society. A neutral magis­
trate or judge should identify the threats to society, the targets of the 
search.108 This type of ex ante judicial review of deceptive tactics 
would eliminate almost all deception in connection with searches since 
the police most often misrepresent their authority when they do not 
have probable cause to support the search.109 
This requirement would prohibit the type of deception at issue in 
this Note. As one commentator points out, "[i]n situations in which 
the police misrepresent their authority . . .  they usually lack sufficient 
suspicion to authorize their action. Assuming so, a judge is unlikely to 
find the target is a criminal-enemy to whom police can lie."110 
As in interrogations, if the police obtain consent to relinquish a 
right by deception, the consent is coerced. The argument for doing so 
does not rest on the consenter's view of his options, but rather rests on 
the premise that such deception involves overstepping by the police. 
103. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. I nterestingly, after Schneckloth, the Court maintained its position that the police do 
not need to read the subject of the search his Fourth Amendment rights even if he is in cus­
tody when consent is requested. See LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.2(i). 
107. See Slobogin, supra note 97. 
108. Id. at 808. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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As the next Part argues, the "we can do this the easy way or the hard 
way" statement is just the type of deception that should invalidate 
consent. 
III. INFORMING A SUSPECT THAT REFUSING CONSENT Is FUTILE Is 
DECEPTIVE 
As Part I argued, if an officer tells a consenter that it makes no dif­
ference whether he consents or forces the officer to come back with a 
warrant, the officer intentionally deceives the consenter and the courts 
should not consider the resulting consent valid. Currently, the federal 
circuits reach different results depending on whether the officer made 
the statement in good faith or bad faith. This Part argues that distinc­
tion is not useful because both types of threats should vitiate consent. 
First, telling the subject of a search of his alternatives in "good faith" 
and stating that consent would be better for him or that the choices 
will yield equal implications is deceitful. The police know that the im­
plications are different when they make these statements to consen­
ters. The police make the false statement with the intention of con­
vincing the consenter to relinquish his rights, which is coercive. 
Second, telling the subject of the search of his alternatives in "bad 
faith" is not distinguishable from the "good faith" statement, and 
therefore courts should prohibit them both. 
Courts typically classify some police references to search warrants 
as unobjectionable. These references fall into two categories, one in 
which the police officer has not made the statement as a pretext in or­
der to coerce the consenter, and the second where there is actual 
probable cause to support a warrant if the officer applied for one.m 
This Note uses the shorthand phrase "good faith" statement to refer to 
such statements. While not explicitly stated, since other good faith 
tests under the Fourth Amendment employ an objective standard, this 
test presumably would also be an objective test. It would, then, apply 
equally to the officer who should have known a warrant was obtain­
able, and would not apply to the officer who thought a warrant was 
obtainable when that thought was unreasonable under the circum­
stances. 
If a police officer requests consent to search a home, the owner 
may initially refuse, or at least show reluctance to freely consent to the 
search. The police officer, in an effort to secure consent, may inform · 
the subject that if he continues to refuse consent, they will return with 
a search warrant anyway, and when they return they will bring addi­
tional uniformed officers in marked cars, which will cause consider-
111. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp.2d 678, 687-88 (S.D. Tex. 2000) and 
cases cited therein. 
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able embarrassment.112 This is the "we can do this the easy way or the 
hard way, but either way we will do what we want" message. The sub­
ject consequently gives his consent. If the officers actually thought or 
should have thought that there was probable cause for a warrant, 
courts would consider the threat a "good faith" threat and uphold the 
resulting consent.113 
This is the wrong result because there is no such thing as a "good 
faith" threat to obtain a search warrant. The trained police officer 
knows or should know that the implications for the consenter differ 
depending on whether the search is conducted by consent or by war­
rant. They ask for consent instead of waiting for a warrant precisely 
for these reasons.114 Courts are less likely to suppress evidence col­
lected during a consent search.115 As exclusionary rule jurisprudence 
makes clear, the exclusion of evidence is a strong motivating factor for 
police officers.116 Additionally, officers can conduct a much wider 
search if a warrant does not establish boundaries of the search. Thus, 
when officers accurately inform a potential consenter that they have 
the ability to obtain and return with a search warrant, they trick the 
consenter into believing either (1) there is no difference for the con­
senter he gives consent or refuses, or (2) the consenter is wiser to give 
consent rather than wait for the search warrant.117 Courts should flatly 
prohibit police from tricking a consenter into giving up his rights.118 
112. See, for examRle, United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 1998), holding that 
consent was voluntary where defendant initially refused consent, but later consented when 
FBI agents explained how embarrassing it would be for him to have them return with a war­
rant; and United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1994), describing the interaction be­
tween the FBI agent and defendant as follows: 
The agent allegedly told him that if he signed the consent form the agents would not search 
his house and that 'it would go an awful lot easier on [Evans]'; if he refused to consent, ac­
cording to Glenn, the agent stated that the FBI would obtain a search warrant and search his 
house as well as other areas of his premises. 
Id. at 1224 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1983). 
1 14. See LAFAVE, supra note 60, at § 8.1. 
115. See Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 74 at 948. 
1 16. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
1 17. The Schneckloth court explicitly made the argument that consent searches are bet­
ter for the subject than warrant searches. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 
(1972). 
118. At least one circuit has noted that a search warrant statement made in good faith, 
when probable cause actually exists, is beneficial in that it serves to notify the consenter of 
his right to demand a warrant search. See United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1 123, 
1130 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that when determining whether the defendant consented vol­
untarily, the factor of whether a search warrant statement was made could work for or 
against voluntariness, depending on whether the statement was made in a threatening man­
ner). That analysis is misguided because the police have only partially informed the consen­
ter of his rights, and misconstrued his rights by making it seem advantageous to grant con-
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What if the police, knowing they have no probable cause to search a 
home, ask the owner to consent to a search. After his initial refusal, 
the police tell him that if he continues to refuse to consent, they will 
return with a search warrant anyway. This is what courts term a bad 
faith threat: the police make the statement with the knowledge that a 
magistrate would not grant a search warrant. The statement is made 
anyway purely to trick the consenter into giving consent, since that is 
the only way the police will be able to gain access. This type of decep­
tion is correctly recognized as improper and unlawful by most courts. 
But why treat it differently from the good faith threats? The effect on 
the consenter is the same if probable cause exists or not: they are told 
they do not have a choice to refuse entry to the police. The motiva­
tions of the police are the same: depriving the consenter of his rights 
to be searched pursuant to a warrant. Courts should use the same rea­
soning they use when looking down on bad faith threats as they do 
when considering good faith threats. As this Part shows, the police 
telling the subject of a search that "we can do this the easy way or the 
hard way" is deceptive and coercive, and courts should invalidate the 
practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The courts should prohibit the police practice of informing the 
consenter that the police will return with a warrant if the potential 
consenter refuses consent. Even if it is true that a magistrate could 
grant a search warrant, the officer is misinforming the consenter of his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment. While the Supreme Court has 
not obligated the police to inform the consenter of his Fourth 
Amendment rights, he cannot misrepresent or lie to the consenter 
about his rights. Furthermore, by allowing such threats, courts encour­
age just the type of searches that the Fourth Amendment was meant 
to prohibit - those conducted without the neutral determination of 
probable cause by a detached magistrate. Therefore, courts should not 
permit consent searches when the officer misrepresents the rights of 
the consenter by telling him his options are to consent or to wait for 
the officer to return with a warrant. 
sent rather than waiting for a search warrant. A similar situation exists if a police officer in­
forms a suspect that if he does not speak to the police without his lawyer, things will be much 
worse for him. Or, in other words, the police construe the assertion of the suspect's right as 
harmful to the suspect. The Court, in Miranda, prohibited the police from using trickery to 
entice a suspect into waiving his rights. See supra Part II. Moreover, such deceit is offensive 
to anyone who believes in the value of constitutional protections. 
